As the crisis in Venezuela continues to deepen, many in the US policy community are discussing the possibility of a regime change operation against illiberal governments around the world. Advocates of this strategy claim that it achieves political objectives more cheaply and quickly than sustained diplomatic pressure and engagement. They also argue that the process is less likely to escalate into a military conflict than would be the case with direct military action.
However, a vast literature has documented the many ways that regime change efforts can backfire. These failures typically leave the intervening country worse off, and they often lead to a prolonged period of instability. This article surveys this body of scholarship and argues that policymakers should consider the full costs of forcibly changing foreign governments.
Regime change operations usually involve a powerful country putting its weight behind an anointed person and declaring that he or she is the legitimate leader of the country. The examples are many, from the US-engineered coup in Guatemala in 1954 to protect the business interests of United Fruit, to the more recent ouster of Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi. In most cases, the new government fails to establish a robust state bureaucracy and lacks the resources to develop the economic infrastructure necessary for a stable society.
In addition, a regime change policy is unlikely to change the politics of a foreign country in ways that benefit America. Instead, officials should embrace the reality that foreign polities have their own priorities, and that simply removing the existing leadership is unlikely to shift them in a way that favors American interests.
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